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The European Monetary Union is currently experi-
encing a serious internal balance of payments crisis
that is similar, in many important ways, to the crisis of
the Bretton Woods System in the years prior to its
demise. In response to the crisis, the eurozone coun-
tries have mobilized enormous public rescue funds as
of May 2010. However, funding really started some
21/2 years prior to that point, in the autumn of 2007,
when some eurozone countries began to draw Target
loans out of the ECB system which happened to come
largely from the German Bundesbank, recently also
from the Dutch central bank, and amounted to sums
that dwarf these countries’ participation in the official
rescue packages. The Ifo Institute has published sev-
eral papers on this topic in recent months1 and has
effectively created the first comprehensive eurozone
Target database.2
Today it is the economic interpretation of events,
rather than the facts, which is controversial. For this
reason we have compiled various opinions in a spe-
cial issue of the CESifo Forum. The authors range
from current representatives of the Bundesbank and
the ECB, who wish to convey a sense of normality, to
Helmut Schlesinger, ex-Bundesbank President and
Georg Milbradt, the former Minister President and
Finance Minister of Saxony, who express their deep
concern regarding the Target balances. Schlesinger
explicitly criticises the reassuring statements issued
by his former institution. The economists from uni-
versities and banks who submitted comments basi-
cally share Schlesinger’s view emphasizing, among
other things, the parallels to other balance of pay-
ments crises. 
To facilitate the readers’ familiarisation with the
topic, the Ifo Institute’s views on the facts presented in
earlier publications are summarised below. As the
contributions and replies published in this issue refer
to these views, it makes sense to outline them here.
Borrowing the money printing press
The accumulated balance of payments deficit or sur-
plus of a euro country is measured by its Target lia-
bility or claim, as shown on the balance sheet of its
central bank. In a currency union money usually
criss-crosses country boundaries in either direction,
with inflows and outflows balancing out. A balance of
payments imbalance arises for a country if there is a
net flow of money across its borders paying for an
adverse net flow of goods and/or assets.3 To the extent
that the net flow of money occurs electronically
through the banking system it is recorded in the
Target accounts. We speak of a Target deficit and sur-
plus, respectively, to denote the net flow of money
crossing a border, and of a Target debt and liability to
denote the respective accumulated stocks, which are
recorded in the balance sheets of national central
banks. 
The reason why the Target balances are recorded in
the balance sheets of national central banks can per-
haps best be understood by seeing the net flows of
money as resulting from the attempt of a deficit
country to refinance its payment deficit by borrowing
a printing press from other central banks. This
heuristic interpretation will be explained in greater
detail below. 
However, before we come to the economics, let us take
a closer look at the bare facts. Until the first break-
down of the interbank market in 2007 there were
hardly any noticeable balance of payments imbal-
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1 See, for example, Sinn (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d and 2011e);
Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011a) and in particular (2011b). 
2 In principle the Target data stem from the NCB balance sheets.
However, as some countries do not publish such data, they have to
be reconstructed from IMF statistics. For details see Sinn and
Wollmershäuser (2011, and particularly the appendix of the NBER
version of that paper). The ECB itself does not possess a compre-
hensive data set, but reconstructed the data for missing countries in
the same way as the Ifo Institute has done. See European Central
Bank (2011, 37, footnote 5).
3 The term ‘money’ is used here always in the sense of ‘central bank
money’ or ‘base money’. ances in the eurozone. But then they increased rapid-
ly, showing huge deficits in the GIPS countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain). By the middle of
2011 (June), the sum of the accumulated balance of
payments deficits (Target liabilities) of the GIPS
countries had risen to 327 billion euros. Its counter-
part was the sum of accumulated balance of pay-
ments surpluses (Target claims) of Germany, which
were 337 billion euros by that time. 
Until the summer of 2011, sizeable balance of pay-
ments disequilibria in the euro area basically only con-
cerned these countries. Even Italy’s balance of 
payment was in equilibrium. In August 2011, how  ever,
things started to change dramatically, with the public
finances of Italy and France coming under closer
scrutiny. The Italian Target balance, which was – 16 bil-
lion euros in July, had skyrocketed to – 191 billion
euros by the end of 2011. Similarly, the French Target
balance went from + 1 billion euros in July to – 80 bil-
lion euros in November. Meanwhile Germany’s Target
claim increased to 463 billion euros in December 2011
or 5.7 thousand euros per capita. About half of
Germany’s net foreign wealth is now a Target claim of
the Bundesbank against other central banks in Europe. 
Not only the Bundesbank accumulated Target claims.
The Dutch central bank also was heavily involved. By
November 2011, the Dutch central bank had accumu-
lated a claim of 145 billion euros, which amounted to
even 8.7 thousand euros per capita. 
If a country’s money is seeping away to other juris-
dictions, the stock of money circulating at home is
shrinking. To compensate for this shrinkage, the
national central bank usually reprints whatever is
needed to keep the liquidity provision of the country
intact, and this is what the GIPS countries did. As
they ran short of money earned or borrowed abroad,
they printed it. To be precise, the national central
banks created money electronically by providing cred-
it to their commercial banks, and this money then
replaced the money that seeped away electronically
via the international Target transactions accounts.
The term ‘printing’, of course, is the commonly used
heuristic metaphor for ‘money creation’, a mere
accounting issue.
Contrary to what one may think, there are no quotas
tying the money creation of a country’s national cen-
tral bank to its size. A country that runs out of money
in its business dealings with foreign countries is
allowed to reprint whatever it needs, provided it fol-
lows the ECB rules for lending refinancing credit to
commercial banks. The only limit on the creation of
money related to country size is the amount of collat-
eral that commercial banks can offer for refinancing
the credits that they draw, but the ECB has gradually
extended this limit by reducing the safety require-
ments for the collateral accepted. Nowadays, govern-
ment bonds of Greece, Ireland and Portugal are
acceptable as collateral despite the fact that the rating
agencies do not give them investment grade. More  -
over, ABS paper created by the banks themselves and
non-marketable claims have increasingly been accept-
ed as collateral. 
The additional money that was put into circulation by
the central banks of the GIPS countries and which
then seeped away to other countries of the euro area
financed a net inflow of goods and assets. Here, the
term ‘assets’ is being defined broadly. It comprises
companies, stocks, bonds or mere promissory notes or
‘IOUs’ as the counterpart of a loan raised abroad.4
Goods, in turn, comprise services (including financial
services), merchandise and commodities, as recorded
in the current account. 
Countries whose balance of payment is in equilibrium
have no net flow of goods and assets with foreign
countries. The net importers of goods pay their for-
eign partners with an outflow of assets, and the net
exporters of goods buy those foreign assets with their
revenues. Only countries whose balance of payment is
in disequilibrium have such net flows. The net
importers of goods and assets suffer from an outflow
of money, and the net exporters of goods and assets
enjoy an inflow of money.
Before the crisis, the GIPS countries were also in equi-
librium, as they succeeded in financing their net
imports of goods with asset sales or, equivalently, by
borrowing abroad. They borrowed the euros that they
needed to buy the goods. However, as soon as the cri-
sis became international, credit flows (mostly inter-
bank credit) dried up and the GIPS countries turned
instead to their national central banks to satisfy their
borrowing requirements. To be more specific: as soon
as a changed risk perception caused banks from other
countries to require substantially higher interest for
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the funds they were lending to banks in the GIPS
countries, the latter preferred to borrow newly created
euros from their central banks instead. These euros
were then flowing out to the rest of the eurozone like
the privately borrowed euros had been doing before
the crisis, creating the net outflow of money measured
in the Target or balance of payments statistics. 
In Ireland the situation was even more exceptional
and extreme than in the other GIPS countries insofar
as outright capital flight took place.5 The asset (and
IOU) sales, with which Irish institutions had hitherto
financed the current account deficit, stopped abrupt-
ly. What is more, as the outstanding assets lying in for-
eign portfolios were returned, Ireland had a sudden
refinancing need which was covered by the Central
Bank of Ireland with fresh refinancing credit. Or, to
say it in yet another way, the breakdown of the inter-
bank market meant that banks from the core coun-
tries stopped providing new credit to Ireland and even
repatriated their maturing loans, returning the debt
titles which backed those loans to the Irish banks. 
In Germany the situation was completely the reverse.
Before the crisis, Germany bought assets abroad and
paid for them with the money received for its net
export of goods, i.e. Germany was lending its export
surplus to other countries. During the crisis, German
investors lost interest in foreign assets, and so more
and more of the money that Germany earned by
exporting goods in net terms to other countries,
stayed at home. 
The net flow of money from the GIPS countries to
Germany, which is measured by the Target balances,
crowded out the credit that the Bundesbank granted
to German commercial banks, as their demand for
liquidity was limited. As the German banking system
was swimming in liquidity, it tried to get rid of the
surplus liquidity resulting from the net inflow of
money by lending money to the Bundesbank or tak-
ing less refinancing credit. (The situation was effec-
tively similar to that of a normal market, where
demand is limited and a new supplier crowds out the
incumbent supplier.) This destroyed the extra money
that had been created in the periphery, which implied
that both the aggregate stock of money balances and
its international distribution remained unchanged.
Thus, the cross border money flows measured by the
Target account were automatically sterilized and
involved no direct inflation risk.6
To return to the metaphor of physical money once
again, one could say that the periphery countries
printed the money they could no longer borrow in the
markets to finance their purchases of goods and
assets abroad, and that the Bundesbank and the
Dutch central bank then destroyed the inflowing
euros with its shredding machine.
As the additional granting of central bank credit in
the GIPS countries for the purpose of buying for-
eign goods or assets neither changed the trend nor
the international distribution of the money supply,
it led to a reduction of the stock of net central bank
credit in the core countries that exactly matched the
extra central bank credit that had been issued in the
periphery. Thus, while the Target balances directly
measure net money flows across the borders they
indirectly also measure an international reallocation
of refinancing credit or, more simply, a public cred-
it flow through the ECB system. It is only logical
therefore that the official balance of payments sta-
tistics call the Target balances ‘capital exports
through the central bank system’.7 It is also entirely
correct to speak of Target credit that the periphery
countries were able to draw out of the Eurosystem
forcing other euro countries, predominantly
Germany, to provide this credit. To take the afore-
mentioned metaphor to its logical conclusion, one
could say that the Bundesbank was lending its
money printing press to the periphery countries,
which is the image referred to at the beginning of
this section.
The empirical facts underpinning these develop-
ments are unambiguous. During the years
2008–2010 the Target credit provided by Germany to
other euro countries was 85 billion euros per year,
while in 2011 it totalled about 140 billion euros. As
private banks were no longer willing to finance the
periphery countries, they drew replacement credit
out of the ECB system, effectively out of the Bun  -
desbank. In fact, developments have been so extreme
that the Bun  desbank’s net refinancing credit (net of
time deposits and deposit facilities) turned negative
5 Capital flight means that domestic and/or foreign investors sell
domestic assets and buy foreign ones.
6 There is an indirect inflation risk, however, insofar as there is an
incentive for the GIPS countries to remove their Target liabilities by
way of voting for a more inflationary policy in the ECB council in
the future. 
7 The credit interpretation is also justified in a direct sense, even if the
net flow of central bank money from country A to country B reduces
A’s stock of money balances and increases B’s as A’s central bank
does not refill the losses and B’s central bank does not sterilize the
inflowing liquidity. The reason is that, without the assignment of
debts and claims to the central banks, A’s central bank would
become richer and B’s central bank poorer, given that the central
bank money transferred disappears from the right hand side of A’s
central bank balance sheet and reappears on the right-hand side of
B’s central bank balance sheet.in the summer of 2011 and became – 179 billion
euros in November 2011. 
Displacement of central bank credit by the money
flowing in from abroad is reminiscent of the Bretton
Woods System. At the time, dollars flowed into
Germany and were exchanged into D-marks by the
Bundesbank. The stocks of D-marks thus created dis-
placed domestic credit creation by the Bundesbank,
which had been the normal way of putting D-marks
into circulation. As at that time, the Bundesbank is
now exporting a considerable share of German sav-
ings to other parts of the world. Back then it was
argued that the Bundesbank financed the Vietnam
war. Now the Bundesbank is financing the staggering
periphery countries. Wilhelm Kohler and other
authors examine this topic in greater detail in this
issue.
The relocation of credit certainly did not result in a
credit squeeze in Germany. After all, the crowding out
of refinancing credit resulted from the abundance of
liquidity in Germany, as German banks did not dare
lending abroad and foreign flight capital came in. As
German savings capital preferred to stay in the save
haven, there even was an investment boom in
Germany. 
Whether good or bad, it is a matter of fact that cred-
it relocation via the ECB System meant that part of
the German savings capital was flowing out via the
system of central banks, rather than via the interbank
markets. This slowed down the adjustment processes
in the countries of the periphery, which would other-
wise have been enforced by the markets. The econom-
ic content of events is more or less the same as that
induced by public rescue facilities bringing about a
flow of credit from the core to the periphery. Such res-
cue facilities signal that the rescuers have no financing
problems themselves, but they nevertheless involve
public capital exports.
As markets would probably have been way too bru-
tal with periphery countries, this was the right pol-
icy in the short run when the interbank market
broke down in the aftermath of Lehman. Given
that parliaments took a long time to come up with
rescue programs, it was definitely right for the ECB
to step in at the time. However, it is debatable
whether this was the right policy in the long run, or
indeed whether it should have been pursued once
the world economy recovered in the second half of
2009. Emergency policies that are justified in an
acute crisis often have problematic effects if pur-
sued over a longer period of time. The Target poli-
cy, in particular, can be criticized for the following
reasons: 
￿ As neither the allocation of money across the
countries of the eurozone nor the overall stock of
money was affected the Target policy, this policy
was basically fiscal rather than monetary. The pub-
lic credit flows should therefore have been sanc-
tioned by the parliaments of the eurozone. 
￿ The Target policy involves high risks for the central
banks of the eurozone’s cores, as they bear a risk
which normally would be borne by private capital
markets.
￿ Cheap access to the euro printing press gave crisis
countries an irrefutable argument when they invit-
ed the core countries to undertake open rescue
activities and may have kept countries in the euro-
zone that otherwise would have preferred to exit
and devalue to restore their competitiveness. 
￿ Requiring equal interest from all commercial
banks, regardless of the country risk, is tanta-
mount to subsidizing capital flows (as the mathe-
matically expected interest rates fall the higher the
default risk). 
￿ Offering refinancing credit at below market condi-
tions causes capital flight as private interbank
credit is unable and unwilling to compete with the
printing press, which is an aspect that will be dis-
cussed in greater detail below. 
￿ The allocation of capital to the single euro coun-
tries is no longer determined by market forces,
but by a central planning organization (called the
ECB).
On the magnitude of the effects
The Target credits do not involve small amounts
that may have some influence over the events at the
margin, they account for amounts representing two
and a half times the sum of the GIPS country gov-
ernment bonds bought by the central banks of the
ECB system. For the Bundesbank, the Target claims
are now the biggest asset position on their balance
sheet; while for Germany they constitute by far the
biggest contribution to rescue operations in the euro
area. 
The degree to which money creation and lending in
the GIPS countries have exceeded the normal measure
is shown by the following numbers:
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￿ The share of GIPS countries
in the total stock of net cen-
tral bank credit given to
banks of the Euro  system
amounted to 119 percent in
September 2011, although
they account for only 18 per-
cent of economic output. 
￿ 91 percent of the current ac  -
count deficit of Greece over
the three years 2008 to 2010
and 94 percent of the current
account deficit of Por  tugal
over the same period were not
financed by normal capital
flows via the markets, but by
Target credits. 
￿ 96 percent of Germany’s cur-
rent account surplus (255 bil-
lion euros of 264 billion
euros) with other euro countries in the years 2008
to 2010 was not, as is normally the case, converted
into private assets received from foreigners, but to
mere Target claims against the ECB system.
Figure 1 shows how the Target money created in the
GIPS countries and Italy (I will refer to this group as
GIIPS) replaced ordinary money created in the core
euro countries by way of the respective central banks
buying assets (like gold or government bonds) and
providing refinancing credit. The green line shows the
composition of the total stock of euro base money
actually circulating in the GIIPs countries and the rest
of the eurozone, the ‘core’. As this total stock is set
equal to 100 percent the height of the green line is the
share of money circulating in the GIIPS countries and
the width of the area above is the share of money cir-
culating in the core. 
The graph also details the origins of this money: the
width of the white area stands for refinancing opera-
tions and that of the two yellow areas for purchases
of gold and other assets by the banking sectors of the
GIIPs and core countries, respectively. The height of
the red line measures the money originating in the
periphery from refinancing credit and purchases of
gold and other assets, and the distance between the
red line and the 100 percent line shows the money
originating from similar measures in the core.
Accordingly, the vertical distance between the red
line and the green line represents the money ‘generat-
ed’ in the periphery and ‘circulating’ in the core, i.e.
the net amount of money that was cabled across the
border in exchange for a net purchase of goods and
assets. As argued above, this can also be taken as a
measure of the official ECB credit given by the core
NCBs to the NCBs in the periphery, compensating
for missing ordinary imports of capital and money
into the periphery or outright capital flight from
there to the core. 
The figure shows that the process has now absorbed the
entire net central bank credit in the core and has 
even made it negative (– 277 billion euros in November
2011). Obviously, not only the Bundesbank, but the
core NCBs in the aggregate have now become net
debtors to their respective commercial banking systems,
which may pose severe problems in terms of the sus-
tainability of the euro system, as various authors have
pointed out.8
Figure 2 shows the extent to which credit outflows
from Germany enforced by the ECB system have
increased since the introduction of the euro by relat-
ing these credit flows to other capital movements
and the German volume of savings. In the period
2002 to 2010 Germany had total aggregate savings of
1,705 billion euros (households, business and gov-
ernment). This was the amount available for domes-
tic and foreign public and private investment. Only
640 billion euros of this amount were invested in
Germany. The remainder, 1,066 billion euros, went
abroad as capital exports. 27 percent of total savings
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8 See, in particular, Tornell and Westermann (2011 and 2012) and
Kohler (2012).tal, 13 percent by net direct investment and 21 per-
cent by Target credits. Thus, since the introduction
of the euro, Target credits issued by the Bundesbank
have accounted for one third of Germany’s total cap-
ital exports. The open rescue credits that were grant-
ed to Greece and Ireland in 2010 are not contained
in this sum. They are part of the net exports of
financial capital. 
Since these capital exports via the Bundesbank were
created almost entirely during the years 2008–2010,
the calculation for this period is even more extreme.
During this period Germany exported 70 percent of
its savings. Of these exported savings, i.e. German
capital exports, 59 percent were accounted for by
Target credits granted by the Bundesbank. 
Relationship to open rescue operations
The financing of the peripheral euro countries by a
mere relocation of central bank credit from the core
countries obviously has heavily distorted the balance
sheets of the national central banks of the Euro  -
system, raising the question of how far this process
can proceed. Whatever the answer to this question,
which is raised by some of the authors in this issue, it
is clear that the ECB must have been highly alarmed
by recent events and must have tried to hold the
process in check by asking politicians to step in with
the public rescue operations that have been agreed
upon since May 2010. 
In fact, these public rescue oper-
ations have very similar econom-
ic implications to those of the
rescue activities that have been
taking place within the ECB sys-
tem. In both cases, there is a true
credit granted by the German
government to the periphery
countries, commonly guaranteed
by the community of states,
which, like any other credit,
allows them to buy more goods
and assets abroad than would
otherwise have been possible. In
terms of liability, the internation-
al distribution of the money sup-
ply, international payment pro  -
cesses, the credit relationships
between countries and the true
transfer of resources, this is iden-
tical to common, proportionately
guaranteed Eurobonds to finance credit for the GIPS
countries, sold by a European central entity to the
German government, for which the latter borrows in
the capital markets. The difference with true
Eurobonds that are acquired by the German govern-
ment is merely that the interest rate is much lower,
that the commercial banks of the GIPS countries
could draw this credit as they liked if they could offer
collateral, and that the Bundesbank could not refuse
the purchase of these implicit Eurobonds. Whatever
the economic effects of credit relocation on the par-
ticipating economies and whatever the risks for
donor countries, in terms of credit relocation they are
largely identical to those inherent in an issue of
Eurobonds with proportionate common liability. The
reluctant investment capital is now being pushed
abroad by the public authorities. 
The example of the United States
The ability to take out unlimited Target credits is a
design flaw of the euro as a common currency that
was mercilessly exposed by the European debt crisis.
While the Target system as such, of course, is neces-
sary for international transactions and is a useful self-
stabilizing device in the acute phase of a crisis, it has
problematic long-term implications insofar as it pro-
vides public credit at interest rates that do not reflect
the investment risk and undercut market prices. Given
that the artificial pre-crisis equalization of interest
rates caused excessive capital flows in the eurozone
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that led to an overheating of the periphery and caused
huge current account deficits, it is a problematic fea-
ture of the Target credit system that it offers a similar
interest-equating mechanism at the short side of the
asset spectrum. This is likely to prolong and extend
the current account imbalances that the eurozone is
currently suffering from. 
Moreover, as mentioned in one of the bullet points
above, the availability of cheap Target credit, current-
ly at a rate of only 1 percent, may very well even have
caused the capital flight that it is trying to compensate
for. Without the availability of such credit as cheap as
that banks which can draw out of the Eurosystem,
they would have to pay higher interest rates, and at
higher interest rates foreign bank credit might not
have dried up in the first place. In other words, the
self-reinforcing run of investors from which even Italy
and France are now suffering might not have taken
place. To a considerable large extent the problems the
eurozone is facing today may represent a mere portfo-
lio reshuffling resulting from the fact that markets are
forced to compete with the printing press, a competi-
tion they know they can never win. 
In view of these problems it is useful to look at the US
Federal Reserve System which, in principle, has to
cope with similar problems. In the United States, sin-
gle states can also draw Target-like credit out of the
Federal Reserve System. However, doing so is rather
unattractive as it has to occur at market conditions. In
the United States, negative balances of the Inter-
District Settlement Account, which are analogous to
Target debts, must be paid for in April of each year by
the transfer of ownership shares in gold-backed secu-
rities or other marketable securities that offer risk-
specific interest rates. For that purpose the Federal
Reserve Bank holds a clearing portfolio of marketable
assets whose ownership shares (including the interest
income generated by this portfolio) are reallocated
among the respective District Central Banks accord-
ing to the Target-like imbalances. A District Central
Bank (of which there are twelve) is only allowed to
create more money than is used in its district if this
district hands over marketable assets to other districts
for the money seeping from it to them for the net pur-
chases of goods or assets. 
A district that wants to import more goods than it
exports must therefore obtain a private loan in other
districts, or its central bank must pay its counterparts
in other districts with marketable assets. In the latter
case there will still be some lending among the dis-
tricts via the central banking system, as in Europe, but
this will take place under market conditions. 
The European Union could consider adopting the US
rules by asking indebted central banks to hand over
safe or rather safe marketable assets via the ECB to
the other central banks who hold Target claims. This
would reduce the incentive to draw Target credit out
of the ECB system instead of borrowing in the private
market, thus ending the capital flight that currently
threatens the stability of the Eurosystem. To mitigate
the problem for overly indebted states, transition or
grandfathering rules could also be established that
would permit a gradual reduction of the existing
Target debts to other central banks. 
The cause of the crisis
The cause of the internal balance of payments crisis
in the euro area which the ECB tries to solve with the
printing press is that the GIPS countries have become
too expensive due to the cheap credits that flowed
under the euro in the pre-crisis period. The speculative
bubbles financed by cheap credit burst when the
American financial crisis swept over to Europe in
2007. In the early years of the euro, capital markets
were willing to finance the current account deficits
resulting from excessive wages and prices, but as soon
as the markets shied away, these bubbles burst. During
the first three years that followed these stalling private
capital flows, the GIPS countries relied on their print-
ing presses to lower their financial deficits (Spain
printed less than its current account deficit. Ireland
printed in excess of it, while Greece and Portugal cre-
ated cash roughly according to their current account
deficits), but as the ammunition for such manoeuvres
started to run low and the ECB became increasingly
nervous, parliaments decided to help out by setting up
public rescue facilities that replaced the credit drawn
out of the ECB system with public credit. 
In the capital markets the continued financing of the
deficit countries, which no longer has much to do with
fighting a short-term liquidity crisis and compensat-
ing for dysfunctional markets, creates a one-sided
downward risk for the investors, because it keeps the
prices of stocks, bonds or real estate above equilibri-
um. As everyone knows that prices will fall once the
pockets of the rescuers are empty, the incentive to
escape the foreseeable wealth loss by reallocating
wealth abroad is overwhelming. Thus, the euro area is
reeling from one capital market crisis to the next, andduring every crisis there is an attempt to react with a
renewed expansion of bail-out packages. In the end,
when private capital has largely been replaced with
public rescue capital and rich wealth owners have suc-
cessfully handed over their toxic government bonds to
the taxpayers of other states, bankruptcies and hair-
cuts will follow, forcing the new owners to accept the
inevitable. 
In the goods markets on-going rescue operations
maintain the artificially high prices and wages that
built up during the bubbles. This perpetuates deficits
in the current accounts, which are the deeper reason
for the balance of payments crisis, by preventing the
creation of competitive industrial jobs and keeping
incomes and imports high. 
It is doubtful whether the strategy of continuing to
publicly finance the balance of payments deficits of
the periphery countries will ever succeed in creating
equilibrium in the euro area. Instead, it seems more
likely that the rescue strategy, which was initiated by
the ECB and is now to be continued in all openness,
will be pursued until the reserves of the more finan-
cially stable countries are exhausted. Only at the very
end, when even the strongest countries have their
backs to the wall and have run out of credit, will real
internal devaluation in the crisis-stricken euro coun-
tries be agreed upon. Only then will the competitive-
ness of the GIPS countries be restored and the euro
area brought into equilibrium. 
For the survival of the euro it will now be decisive to
develop a rescue strategy that lies between the
extremes of discontinuing the rescue funds immedi-
ately and the unlimited financing of current account
deficits via Eurobonds. For this purpose, a procedure
should be developed to promote meaningful use of
the available subsidies, which will gradually end the
flow of public funds and initiate the real devaluation
of the GIPS countries that is required. In its most
recent annual report the European Economic
Advisory Group at CESifo developed a three-stage
crisis procedure with well-defined aid funds provided
by replacement bonds.9
To date, a real devaluation is still pending in most
cases. With the exception of Ireland, the economies of
the GIPS countries and Italy show little, if any, indi-
cation that their prices are rising more slowly than
those of their trading partners in the euro area. That
is one reason why the euro area is still miles away from
a solution to its balance of payments crisis. 
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